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NEW YORK'S PROPOSED SIMPLIFIED PRACTICE
ACT
HISTORY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE ACTS
The common law procedure of England was accepted by New
York upon entering upon its existence as a commonwealth. In
1848, the Code of Procedure, known as the Field Code, was
adopted, thereby introducing substantial changes in the common
law practice. Later, in 1877 and i88o, the two parts of the
present Code of Civil Procedure, now consisting of more than
3,300 sections, were adopted, thus bringing together matters
relating to procedure, whether substantive or otherwise, and
practically all details of practice were thereby regulated by statu-
tory enactment, except that in addition there are various general
rules of practice, and also local statutes and rules governing
inferior courts.
Those not familiar with actual conditions in a large city like
New York, must necessarily draw upon their imagination and
endeavor to picture, for example, the trial and special terms of
the supreme court in New York county (or Borough of Man-
hattan), where 6 parts or court rooms are devoted to the trial
of actions without jury, 2o parts to jury trials, one part to ex
parte business and one part where as many as IOO to 15o, and
more, "contested" motions are on the calendar every day. In
addition, there is the appellate division of the supreme court and
the appellate term, and also the various trial and special term
parts of the city court as well as nine district municipal courts
having jurisdiction of actions involving $i,ooo or less, some of
these also having a number of trial parts each day. Relative
conditions exist in other counties within the present City of New
York. It is not to be expected, therefore, that the present system
of procedure is entirely satisfactory. Indeed, one might imagine
that it could hardly be expected that any system of procedure
could be devised which would work satisfactorily under such
conditions.
Since 1895, commissions and committees have, from time to
time, been appointed, official and unofficial, all of which have
met and adjourned, some have considered and reported or for-
gotten to report, until now the official Board of Statutory Con-
solidation has drafted and submitted to the legislatiire its report
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on the simplification of the civil practice. A joint committee of
the legislature now has the matter under advisement, and it is
doubtful whether the proposed new act, or any substituted act,
will reach the legislature for vote, before 1917. This is well, as
the widest possible debate should precede the final adoption of
a new practice act.
STRUCTURE OF THE PROPOSED ACT
The proposed act consists of 71 sections, which are largely
recommendations of what is regarded as ideal rather than com-
mands as to procedure. Large portions of the present Code of
Civil Procedure, while not abolished, have been given less
"practical" aspect by being turned into the Consolidated Laws,
which are equivalent to the revised statutes or revised laws as
known in many of the states. It is this practice act of 71 sec-
tions which it is intended shall be the creature of the legislature,
but in order to prescribe more or less detail for the practice, the
Board has also prepared 4O rules, which in the first instance
shall also be enacted by the legislature, but thereafter are to be
in the hands of the courts, so that the control of and responsi-
bility for procedural matters shall be in the hands of the courts.
FEATURES OF THE PROPOSED PRACTICE
Only the main features of the act and rules can be referred
to, and in order to avoid repetition, the present or past tense will
be frequently employed, thus treating the matter as if the act
now existed. There is to be but one form of action (§ 4);
mistakes, irregularities or defects, not affecting a substantial
right are to be disregarded, (§ io); costs are discretionary,
(§ 15) ; any number of causes of action or counterclaims may
be set up in the same complaint or answer, (§ 19), and great
liberality in the joinder of parties is also permitted, (§ 20) ; the
demurrer is abolished and all relief for defective pleading shall
be by motion, (§ 27) ; trial without a jury is made the normal
mode of trial, and trial by jury must be specifically demanded or
is waived, "but a jury trial may be had, by order, of any issue
of fact notwithstanding such waiver, or a jury trial may be
dispensed with by order, in a case where the right to dispense
with a jury trial now exists," (§ 34); the practice of taking
exceptions to rulings, verdicts, reports and decisions is discon-
tinued, (§ 35); the unconditional dismissal of a complaint or
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counterclaim at the close of the evidence is to be regarded as
on the merits, unless stated to be without prejudice to a new
action, (§ 36); except by consent of the court, appeals from
intermediate decisions in the nature of the existing interlocutory
judgment, are limited to the appeal from the final judgment,
(§ 48); an order takes the place of an interlocutory judgment
(Rule 37), and there is to be but one judgment.
Special proceedings, such as mandamus, prohibition, for the
appointment of a committee of an incompetent, for the sale,
mortgage or lease of an infant's or incompetent's real property,
and the like, are abolished, and all such are to be actions, to be
commenced by summons and complaint. The Constitution pre-
serves the right to habeas corpus in certain cases and the pro-
posed practice act naturally makes no attempt to abolish any
constitutional right. Again, the special proceeding "writ of
assessment of damages" under which the state or the United
States acquires real property, is retained as a special proceeding.
Other efforts to abolish special proceedings entirely also became
impossible, as for example, a proceeding to change one's name.
Who could be the plaintiff and defendant if that proceeding were
converted into an action? So that also is retained as a special
proceeding. The procedure in such special proceedings is, how-
ever, prescribed by the Consolidated Laws.
NEW FORM OF PROCESS
Two forms of summons for the commencement of an action
are provided. One is the general form of summons to answer,
with which the profession in New York is familiar, and under
which the defendant is called upon to answer the complaint in
twenty days or suffer judgment by default. The other is a new
form to be called "summons to appear." Under this new form,
the defendant is required to appear in court or before a judge,
at a specified time, not less" than eight days from the service,
unless a shorter time is prescribed by endorsement on the sum-
mons. The summons to appear may be used where the plaintiff
seeks only to recover a debt in the nature of a sum certain,
arising upon contract, bonds, statutes, warranty or on a trust,
in summary proceedings and in "cases specifically provided for."
(Rule 86.) The procedure on the return day of the summons
'The proposed rules say "more" which evidently is intended for " less."
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is not prescribed and there is not even any requirement that
the-plaintiff must serve a complaint with the summons. Rule 305
authorizes the court to direct judgment on the return day or
order a reference or a trial, or make such other disposition as
the case may require "unless it appears that the defendant is
entitled to defend," which may mean that in a case where the
summons to appear is authorized, the defendant, on the return
day, must show his hand, volunteer his proof and argue his
case, before he may be permitted to interpose an answer.
PLEADINGS AND SERVICE OF PROCESS
The answer and the reply are "to point out the actual issues."
(§26, and Rules 141 et seq.) The present provisions for sub-
stituted service and service by publication have been partly
stripped of their technical character. The present provision of
the Code of Civil Procedure is also retained, which permits
service without the state, with a judge's order, in certain
instances where the action affects title to real or personal prop-
erty. (Rule 217.) On the other hand, where the action relates
to real property and service is had by publication, the published
notice shall also contain a brief statement of the object of the
action and a brief description of the property. (Rule 215.) A
similar provision is in the present Code of Civil Procedure as to
actions for partition. Since September I, 1914, the authorized
charges for publishing legal notices have been practically
doubled by statutory amendment, and this additional require-
ment would merely add further to the cost of service by publi-
cation. In fact, the whole system of publication might well be
abolished and mailing alone substituted, except where the
defendants or their residences are unknown. A fiction of the law
alone enables us to suppose, however, with suppressed amuse-
ment, that an unknown defendant, last heard of in Australia,
will, except by pure accident, receive notice by a summons pub-
lished in a local newspaper in Brooklyn or in Buffalo.
MOTION FOR DIRECTIONS
In an effort to prevent the making of many preliminary
motions, such as for bill of particulars, to make the pleadings
more definite, discovery, interrogatories, etc., a motion for direc-
tions is provided and is to be made within fourteen days after
the action is at issue, and the decision of the judge thereon is to
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be embodied in a single order. (Rule 241.) This does not,
however, prevent the making of subsequent motions, but may
subject the dilatory party to costs.
APPEALS AND EXECUTION
An appeal shall be in the nature of a rehearing. It is unneces-
sary to take a formal exception to rulings but objections must
still be taken. The appellate courts are authorized in certain
cases to take additional evidence, but not in contravention of
any constitutional right. "In case a new trial is granted it shall
only be a new trial of the question or questions with respect to
which the verdict or decision is found to be wrong if separable.
When a new trial is ordered because the damages are excessive
or inadequate and for no other reason, the verdict shall be set
aside only in respect of damages, and shall stand good in all other
respects." (Rule 331.) The stenographer's minutes of the
trial (not necessarily all) are to be used as the basis of the case
on appeal and the testimony is not to be reduced to narrative
form. The appellant is also required, when he serves his pro-
posed case on appeal, to serve a statement of the questions he
proposes to raise on the appeal. This latter can hardly be said
to be an improvement, as the appellant would, undoubtedly,
include in his statement every conceivable, if not also inconceiv-
able, question which could be raised. Proceedings supplementary
in aid of enforcing the judgment have been simplified to make
possible more direct results and to make subsequent judgment
creditor's actions unnecessary.
SUMMARIZED ARGUMENTS, PRO AND CON
As it has been possible to present scarcely more than a sum-
mary of the more important features of the proposed act and
rules, so it will be possible to refer only in the most general
way to the arguments for and against the change, though the
temptation to linger over the arguments is more than alluring.
The arguments generally advanced against regulating details of
practice by statute are: (I) tinkering by inexperienced legis-
lators; (2) possibility of amendment to suit individual cases;
(3) statutes bind courts to rigid rules; (4) promote contests
over minor points of practice; (5) the responsibility for the
administration of justice -is placed upon the courts while the
control is given to the legislature. On the other hand, objection
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is made to giving courts the power to regulate details of prac-
tice because, it is said, it would be unwise to place such unlim-
ited power in the hands of the courts. Yet it must be admitted
that the courts are daily making the law with reference to sub-
stantive matters. In fact, in whose mind does not linger that
terse definition absorbed in the early days of law-school life,
that "the common law is that body of the law which is judge-
made law as distinguished from the law enacted by the legisla-
ture,"-that paradoxical lex non scripta, which, theoretically
unwritten, might yet be read in the law reports as written by
the judges.2 It must be conceded, of course, that the promulga-
tion of substantive law is theoretically based upon principles of
right and wrong, while rules of procedure are, on the contrary,
always more or less arbitrary, and that therefore the champions
of either side may prolong their disagreement as to whether the
courts or the legislature would be more tender in exercising
arbitrary powers.
Then, there are those who assert that after reading the pro-
posed practice act and rules, and the transpositions into the
Consolidated Laws, they turn away with the impression that
the present Code of Civil Procedure has to a large extent simply
been re-edited, and greater power given to the courts to regulate
details of practice in the future.
There are, however, radical changes, such as the provisions
for the new form of summons to appear, the liberalizing of the
joinder of parties and causes of action, the abolishing of the
demurrer, the attempted simplification in pleading, and in reach-
ing results after judgment. Most of these changes, if not all,
are generally regarded as commendable. It may be debatable
whether proceedings for the sale of an infant's or incompe-
tent's real property, and similar proceedings, may be conducted
in the form of an action, with any more practical feasability
than in the present form. So also, it is proposed to make the
right of appeal from an intermediate decision depend upon the
consent of the court (§48), failing in which, the only appeal
would seem to be from the final judgment. Great hardship may
thus result in some cases. For example, in partition, the inter-
'No inclusive definition of the "common law" is intended by these
observations. They are general only, as it must be recognized that in the
use of the expression there is sometimes included portions of the statute
law of England as it existed prior to the adoption of the common law
in some of the states of the Union.
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locutory judgment directs the sale of the property and this inter-
locutory judgment is now to be an intermediate order. If the
order for the sale of the property is erroneous, and the court
refuses to allow an appeal, the aggrieved party must stand by
and see his property sold, perhaps at a sacrifice and when he
does not want it sold at all, and then wait for the final judg-
ment and appeal therefrom. Meanwhile, however, his property
has been sold and perhaps the very thing he sought to prevent
by his appeal, has taken place. There could be little satisfaction
or consolation for such a suitor in having the order for the sale
reversed on appeal.
There is still another position which those take who are willing
to assume that some of the proposed changes are worthy of
adoption, but who maintain that it resolves itself into the ques-
tion whether the bar favors the entire repeal of the present Code
of Civil Procedure, or whether the same results could be as
satisfactorily obtained by amending the present Code so as to
adopt some of the new acceptable features suggested by the
Revisors.
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